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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the underlying action, Plaintiff seeks relief against Defendant Fairfield to obtain a 
deficiency judgment subsequent to a nonjudicial foreclosure sale which occurred on 
November 25, 2009, as against the guarantors of a promissory note and deed of trust which was 
the subject of the above referenced nonjudicial foreclosure. 
On or about February 26, 2008, Plaintiff, at the request of Defendants and an entity 
known as New Meadows Community Development, LLC, entered into a loan agreement 
whereby Plaintiff loaned New Meadows Community Development, LLC the principal sum of 
$679,000.00. In consideration of this loan, New Meadows Community Development, LLC 
executed and delivered to Plaintiff a promissory note in the principal sum of $679,000.00, 
together with interest thereon at the rate set forth in said promissory note (hereinafter referred to 
as "Note"). 
To secure said payment of said Note, New Meadows Development, LLC granted, 
executed and delivered to Plaintiff a Deed of Trust which granted a security interest in that 
parcel of real property located in Valley County, Idaho, and more particularly described as 
follows: 
Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Block 22, Townsite of New Meadows, as said lots and block are 
numbered and designated on the official plat thereof on file in the Adams County, 
Recorder's Office. 
Also described as Units 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, together with common areas and 
parking, Below the 45th Condominiums, as said units are numbered and shown on 
the official plat thereof on file and of record in the County Recorder's office, 
Adams County, Idaho, recorded September 5, 2007 as Instr. No. 115144 in Book 3 
of Plats page 23. 
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Excepting Therefrom: 
Unit 3 and Unit 4, below the 45th Condominiums, as said units are numbered and 
shown on the official plat thereof on file and of record in the County Recorder's 
office, Adams County, Idaho recorded September 5, 2007 as Instr. No. 115144 in 
Book 3 of Plats ·page 23. 
Said Deed of Trust was thereafter recorded in the records of Adams County, Idaho on 
March 20, 2006 as Instrument No. 111335. 
Pursuant to the loan agreement, Defendant Fairfield executed a written commercial 
guaranty wherein Defendant Fairfield guaranteed full and punctual payment by New Meadows 
Community Development, LLC under the terms of the Note. 
Ultimately, New Meadows Community Development, LLC and Defendant Fairfield 
failed to pay the Note when due under the terms by failing to pay monthly payments required 
therein. Thereafter, Plaintiff proceeded with a nonjudicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust and 
a foreclosure sale of the Deed of Trust was conducted on November 25, 2009. At the 
foreclosure sale, Plaintiff purchased the real property which was the subject of the Deed of 
Trust with a credit bid of $313,064.30. 
On November 12, 2012, Plaintiff initiated suit against Defendant Fairfield and the rest 
of the guarantor Defendants. Defendant Fairfield, by and through his counsel of record, 
Robert A. Bartlett, filed an answer to Plaintiffs complaint on February 10, 2011. On May 9, 
2011, Plaintiff filed and served a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion for 
summary judgment, Plaintiff also filed and served the Affidavit of Jason Delp, Plaintiffs 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, and a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
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The hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was continued several times and 
ultimately was set to be heard on March 8, 2012-approximately 10 months after the date the 
original motion for summary judgment was filed. During this lengthy period of time, 
Defendant Fairfield did not file any material in opposition to Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment. Then, on February 22, 2012, Attorney Robert Bartlett filed an Affidavit in Support 
of a Motion to Continue Hearing. On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed an objection to the 
Motion to Continue. This Objection detailed the history related to the various continuances of 
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. 
A telephonic hearing was held on March 8, 2012. Neither Defendant Fairfield nor his 
counsel, Robert A. Bartlett attended the telephonic hearing. After considering Mr. Bartlett's 
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Continue Hearing, the District Court found that good cause 
did not exist to continue the hearing on Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and ultimately 
granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BY 
THE DISTRICT COURT. 
A. PLAINTIFF PROVIDED SUFFICIENT NOTICE AND EVIDENT/ARY 
SUPPORT FOR THE AMOUNT OF THE DEFICIENCY WHICH WAS 
ULTIMATELY AWARDED PURSUANT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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In his brief and without citing any authority or making any reference to the record before 
this Court, Defendant Fairfield claims that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should not 
have been granted because the "Plaintiff failed in its pleadings to give sufficient notice of the 
amount of the deficiency, and the manner in which the deficiency was calculated .... " Def. 
Fairfield App. Br., p. 1. 
As this Court will note from the record, Defendant Fairfield's argument is simply 
unsupported and without merit. For example, Plaintiffs complaint provides detail of the history 
of the underlying transaction. The complaint identifies that at the time of the nonjudicial 
foreclosure which occurred on November 25, 2009, the amount of the indebtedness due included 
the unpaid principal amount of $469,239.53, accrued interest in the sum of $34,129.88 to 
November 25, 2009, late charges in the sum of $1,520.96, reconveyance fees in the sum of 
$65.00, attorney's fees and nonsufficient fund fees in the amount of $3,605.00 for a total due and 
owing of $508,560.37 as of November 25, 2009. R. Vol. 1, p. 7, LL. 12-18. The complaint also 
identifies that Plaintiff provided a credit bid at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale in the amount of 
$313,064.30 to purchase the subject property. R. Vol. 1, p. 7, LL. 8-9. Further, the complaint 
identifies that the entire amount of the indebtedness due, after the credit bid at the November 25, 
2012 foreclosure sale, was the unpaid principal amount of $195,496.07, accrued assessed interest 
in the sum of $13,280.34 from November 25, 2009 to November 2, 2010 on the unpaid principal 
amount at the Note rate of 7.25% ($38.83 per diem multiplied by 342 days) with interest 
continuing to accrue at the Note rate of 7.25% ($38.83 per diem) until the date of judgment. R. 
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Vol. 1, p. 7, LL. 20-28. This same balance due and owing was again referenced in the portion of 
the complaint which contained the prayer for relief. R. Vol. 1, p. 8, LL. 2-15. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed and served its motion for summary judgment on May 9, 2011. 
Similar to the complaint, Plaintiffs motion identified the unpaid principal balance due and owing 
as of April 8, 2011 included the unpaid principal amount of $195,496.07, and that total accrued 
interest as of April 8, 2011 was the sum of $19,376.65 and that interest would continue to accrue 
at the rate of $33.83 per day until the date of judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 17, LL. 6-11. Filed 
concurrently with this motion, Plaintiff filed and served the Affidavit of Jason Delp which 
provided sworn testimony that detailed the transaction history and which identified that the 
unpaid principal sum of $195,496.07 was due and owing after the credit bid at the nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale, and that interest in the amount of $19,376.65 was due through April 8, 2011,and 
that interest would continue to accrue thereafter at the rate of 7.25% per annum or $38.83 per 
day until the date of judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 22, LL. 6-10. Additionally, Plaintiff filed and 
served a memorandum in support of Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment which similarly 
identified this amount as being due and owing. R. Vol. 1, p. 65, LL. 2-17. Plaintiff filed and 
served Plaintiffs statement of undisputed material facts which identified the same transaction 
history and this same amount as being due and owing. R. Vol. 1, pp. 57-60. Based upon the 
foregoing, Defendant Fairfield was given ample "notice" of not only the entire transaction 
history, but also the resulting unpaid debt at issue at multiple times during this proceeding. 
Ultimately, at the summary judgment hearing, the court was presented with undisputed evidence 
of this debt via the Affidavit of Jason Delp since Defendant Fairfield failed to produce any 
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evidence to dispute the balance due and owing as claimed by Jason Delp under oath. Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56( c) provides, in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
In this case, the court was required pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c) to grant Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment and the resulting judgment therefrom, due to the fact that Defendant Fairfield 
had failed to present any evidence disputing the testimony of Jason Delp regarding the balance 
due and owing. 
In considering this appeal, this Court is to employ the same standards in reviewing an 
order for summary judgment as the district court used when it originally ruled on the motion. 
Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 149 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). When a matter, like 
the case at hand, would be tried to the district court, and not to a jury, the court, as trier of fact, 
"is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence 
properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences." P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,237, 159 P. 
3d. 870, 874 (2007). So, although conflicting evidence must be viewed in a light favorable to the 
nonmoving party, conflicting inferences need not be. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace 
Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 124, 206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009). The appellate court 
exercises free review over the record before it to determine whether the district court's inferences 
are supported, and to determine whether either side is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
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P.O. Ventures, Inc., 144 Idaho at 237, 159 P.3d at 874. At summary judgment, when reasonable 
minds can come to but one conclusion on an issue of fact, a judge may decide the issue as a 
matter of law. Mickelson v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 149, 280 P.3d 176 (2012). A 
failure of the nonmoving party to come forward and produce evidence by affidavit or as 
otherwise provided in the rules to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial, precluding summary judgment, will result in an order granting summary judgment. 
Levinger v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 139 Idaho 192, 75 P.3d 1202 (2003) reh'g denied. 
In this case, no conflicting evidence was produced by Defendant Fairfield in opposition 
to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, the district court could only come to 
one conclusion based upon the undisputed evidence presented via the affidavit of Jason Delp and 
grant Plaintiffs motion. Equally, when this Court considers the same undisputed evidence in this 
case that the district court considered, this Court must also come to the inescapable conclusion 
that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was properly granted due to a complete absence of 
undisputed material facts. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT FAIRFIELD'S REQUEST FOR A 
CONTINUANCE OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING. 
In this case, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment had been filed originally on May 9, 
2011. The hearing on the motion had been continued and was ultimately scheduled to be heard 
on March 8, 2012. 
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During this time, Defendant Fairfield had roughly 10 months to complete any discovery 
needed in the case and to produce any affidavits or deposition testimony which he felt might 
contradict the testimony contained in the Affidavit of Jason Delp. 
As the summary judgment hearing approached, instead of filing a response, on 
February 22, 2012, Attorney Robert Bartlett filed an affidavit in support of motion to continue 
hearing. R. Vol. 1, pp. 66-68. A motion to continue the hearing was not filed with the court. 
On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed an objection to Defendant Fairfield's motion to continue 
which detailed the history of the various extensions related to the summary judgment hearing and 
the issue why "good cause" did not exist to continue the hearing. R. Vol. 1, pp. 69-73. For 
example, as the previously scheduled December 7, 2011 hearing on the summary judgment 
approached, Plaintiffs counsel and Mr. Bartlett spoke about continuing the subject hearing due 
to the tragedy which Mr. Bartlett experienced and the need he had for more time to prepare a 
response to the motion. Accordingly, on November 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed an amended notice of 
hearing essentially continuing the hearing until March 8, 2012 to provide further time for 
Mr. Bartlett. R. Vol. 1, p. 70, LL. 14-22. 
After this continuance, roughly three months passed without further activity on the part of 
Mr. Bartlett in this case. In mid-February 2012, Mr. Bartlett contacted Plaintiffs counsel and 
requested another continuance and indicated that he had lost his file. To expedite matters, 
Plaintiff's counsel agreed to copy the entire file and provide Mr. Bartlett with a copy. R. Vol. 1, 
p. 70, LL. 23-28. 
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The affidavit in support of the motion for continuance detailed the horrible tragedy which 
befell Mr. Bartlett in October 2011, and in the affidavit, Mr. Bartlett stated "I have spent the last 
four (4) months trying to put my life back together, and although I agreed to continue the hearing 
until March 8, 2012, thinking it would be enough time to move forward, it has not been sufficient 
time for me to prepare for the hearing." R. Vol. 1, p. 67, LL. 4-7. 
However, in its objection, Plaintiff pointed out that Defendant Fairfield had had in excess 
of nine months to respond to the summary judgment motion and present admissible evidence 
contesting the facts presented via the Affidavit of Jason Delp. R. Vol. 1, p. 71, LL. 1-6. Further, 
in its objection, Plaintiff also pointed out that pursuant to Rule 1.16(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Mr. Bartlett should have immediately withdrawn from representing 
Defendant Fairfield and substitute counsel should have intervened if Mr. Barlett's physical or 
mental condition materially impaired his ability to represent his client. R. Vol. 1, p. 72, LL. 16-
20. The objection also pointed out that Mr. Bartlett elected not to withdraw-essentially taking 
the position at the time of the prior continuance in November 2011 that he was capable of 
moving forward with Mr. Fairfield's defense. R. Vol. 1, p. 72, LL. 20-22. The objection further 
noted that Plaintiff should not be prejudiced based upon a claim that Mr. Bartlett had not been 
"fit" to respond, when it was Mr. Bartlett's responsibility to withdraw from the case. R. Vol. 1, 
p. 72., LL. 22-26. 
Ultimately, the summary judgment hearing was held telephonically on March 8, 2012. 
Counsel for Plaintiff appeared at the hearing telephonically. Counsel for Defendant Fairfield, 
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Attorney Bartlett, did not appear at the hearing. The reporter's transcript on appeal details the 
court's consideration of the matter at the hearing as follows: 
THE COURT: Well, what the court has before it is a motion for summary 
judgment. Mr. Bartlett filed a motion to continue the summary judgment based 
upon a tragic set of events that occurred some time ago. 
And then there was an objection to the motion to continue the summary 
judgment. And then the court received yesterday a response to the objection to 
the defendant's motion to continue, and I had thought Mr. Bartlett would either 
call in or be present. 
The-in this particular case, this motion at this point in time is not-there 
have been no affidavits submitted in opposition, nor has there been a brief 
submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 
I wanted to hear a little more detail from Mr. Bartlett regarding his request 
to continue the motion. He is not present and has not made arrangements for 
Court Call as set out in the court's notice of procedures for telephonic appearance 
on March 6th that was sent to Mr. Bartlett's address at 722--or e-mailed to him. 
THE CLERK: I e-mailed it to him. 
THE COURT: Emailed it to him. And my clerk has indicated she e-
mailed that. 
And did it appear that the message had gone through? It didn't say 
"undeliverable"? 
THE CLERK: I e-mailed it to all parties, so-
THE COURT: You got the e-mail, too, did you, Mr. Witherspoon? 
MR. ELLINGSEN: Yeah. Yeah I did. Mr. Ellingsen. Yeah. 
THE COURT: Or Mr. Ellingsen. I'm sorry. 
Well, I guess there's always potentially relief that he can pursue under 
Rule 11 for reconsideration. But I am satisfied that there is no material issue of 
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fact. You've demonstrated that the amount is due and payable; that the defendant, 
Fairfield, was served. 
There has been substantial time since Mr. Bartlett's-the issue regarding 
his family and the tragedy that befell him. And I can't find, then, from the record 
before the court, that there's a basis or good cause for continuing the motion for 
summary judgment. There is no-as I said, no issue of fact. The law is clear. 
The court, then, will grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 2, LL. 3-25 & p. 3, LL. 1-21. 
Regarding extensions of time in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment, 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) provides in pertinent part that the court may alter or shorten the time periods and 
requirements for this rule for good cause shown, may continue the hearing, and may impose 
costs, attorney's fees and sanctions against a party or the party's attorney, or both. 
A motion for an extension of time to file additional affidavits, depositions, and 
interrogatories in opposition to a motion for summary judgment lies within the discretion of the 
district court and won't be overturned unless there is a finding that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion for an extension. Bennett v. Bliss, 103 Idaho 358 (Idaho App. 
1982). 
In fact, this case is somewhat similar to the issue the Supreme Court faced in Johnston v. 
Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414 (1979). In this case, Johnston had filed a motion for summary judgment 
on December 5, 1974. On February 14, 1975, Pascoe filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment. On March 4, 1975, Pascoe moved the court for an extension of 
time within which to file additional affidavits, depositions and interrogatories, which was 
opposed by Johnston. Ultimately, on March 12, 1975, the trial court entered its memorandum 
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decision denying the motion for extension of time and ruling that Johnston was entitled to 
summary judgment. Pascoe, thereafter filed an appeal and the matter was considered by the 
Supreme Court. 
In deciding the matter, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that there was no affidavit in the 
record explaining why the information sought could not have been sooner found and presented to 
the trial court. The Supreme Court found that under the facts and circumstances presented to the 
trial court, the Supreme Court could not find that the district court had abused its discretion in 
denying the motion. Regarding an appellate review of this type of issue, the Johnston court 
noted: "In Lasher v. Krasse/t, 96 Idaho 854, 857, 538 P. 2d 783, 786 (1975), this court stated 
regarding abuse of discretion by a trial court:" 
We decline to ascribe a definitive meaning to the amorphous phrase 
"abuse of discretion" (citations omitted) solely for the purposes of this case, but it 
will suffice to say, that where the trial court has exercised such discretion after a 
careful consideration of the relevant factual circumstances and principles of law, 
and without arbitrary disregard for those facts and principles of justice, we will 
not disturb that action. 
Id at 419. Similar to the Johnston case, it is clear from the record that the district court 
considered the affidavit of Robert Bartlett in support of motion to continue and the content 
therein when the district court ultimately denied the request for a continuance. The portion of 
the Reporter's Transcript cited above details the due consideration the district court gave to 
Defendant Fairfield's motion for a continuance. The district court noted that Attorney Bartlett 
had filed the motion to continue based upon a tragic set of events that occurred some time ago. 
But, as the Reporter's Transcript bears out, the district court noted that there was insufficient 
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information provided in support of the motion to continue to explain why such a substantial 
amount of time had passed regarding Mr. Bartlett's family tragedy which warranted another 
continuance. Furthermore, Mr. Bartlett failed to attend the hearing to provide more detail as to 
why additional time was warranted. Based upon the foregoing, the district court concluded that 
it could not find good cause for continuing the motion for summary judgment any further. 
Similar to the District Court's ruling in Johnston v. Pascoe, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it found that good cause was lacking and when it denied Defendant Fairfield's 
motion for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 41, IDAHO 
CODE§ 12-120(3), I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) AND PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE 
UNDERLYING GUARANTEE. 
The District Court was clearly correct in awarding Plaintiff its attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). In the event Plaintiff prevails on this appeal, it respectfully 
submits that pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the underlying guarantee, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); 
and Idaho Appellate Rule 41, that an award to it of its attorney's fees and costs on appeal is 
appropriate. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) provides: "Any party seeking attorney's fees on appeal must 
assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party 
as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5) .... " Pursuant to this Rule, Plaintiff has properly 
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identified its request in this brief (Plaintiffs first appellate brief) as an additional issue on appeal. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of said attorney's fees and costs on appeal based 
upon the following authority: 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty or contract related to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
Further, the underlying guarantee which was executed by Defendant Fairfield provides 
that Defendant Fairfield agreed to pay Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in 
the event of default by Defendant Fairfield. R. Vol. 1, p. 22, LL. 11-19. Specifically, the 
guarantee attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Jason Delp provides: 
Attorneys' Fees; Expenses. Guarantor agrees to pay upon demand all of 
Lender's costs and expenses, including Lender's reasonable attorneys' fees and 
Lender's legal expenses, incurred in connection with the enforcement of this 
Guaranty. Lender may hire or pay someone else to help enforce this Guaranty, 
and Guarantor shall pay the costs and expenses of such enforcement. Costs and 
expenses include Lender's reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses whether 
or not there is a lawsuit, including reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses 
for bankruptcy proceedings(including efforts to modify or vacate any automatic 
stay or injunction), appeals, and any anticipated post-judgment collection 
services. Guarantor also shall pay all court costs and such additional fees as may 
be directed by the court. 
R. Vol. l,p. 37. 
Additionally, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) provides: 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
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parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract. 
In sum, it is clear from Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and the expressed terms of the guarantee 
executed by Defendant Fairfield, that in the event Plaintiff prevails upon this appeal, that 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that this Court affirm the decision rendered by 
the district court in granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Defendant Fairfield has 
failed to establish that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Defendant Fairfield's 
motion to continue the summary judgment hearing. Further, in response to Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment, Defendant Fairfield failed to present any evidence disputing the facts 
presented by Plaintiff. Due to an absence of any disputed material facts, the district court's 
decision to grant Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was clearly proper pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). As a prevailing party on this appeal, Plaintiff requests that this Court grant 
Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2,t;' day of January, 2013. 
Mark A. Ellingsen, ISB No. 4720 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
The Spokesman Review Building 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814-2146 
Attorneys for Sterling Savings Bank 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this~ day of January, 2013, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be served by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Robert A. Bartlett, ISB No. 5794 
LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT A. BARTLETT 
P.O. Box 587 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
16 
~ 
D 
D 
D 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
